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_____
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______
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v.
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________

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE*
Amici are two non-profit public-interest organizations. The Progressive
Intellectual Property Law Association (PIPLA), is a Cleveland organization whose
membership consists of lawyers, law students, professionals, and laypeople interested in
* Consent of all parties has been granted to file this brief of Amici Curiae in partial support of petitioners.
Letters of Consent have been filed with the Clerk of this Court. No counsel for either party had any role in
authoring the brief, and no person other than the named amici and their counsel made any monetary
contributions to the preparation and submission of this brief.
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protecting and supporting the public interest in intellectual property concerns.1 PIPLA
was founded in 1990, in response to the AIDS crisis and the relationship between
pharmaceutical patents and the public interest. PIPLA has since become dedicated to the
more general issue of the relationship between intellectual property and the public
interest. Its members have offered testimony before the Patent and Trademark Office and
have supplied advisory and support services on various intellectual property issues.
This is PIPLA’s first amicus appearance.
The Union for the Public Domain (UPD), located in Washington, D.C., is an
independent membership organization with the goal of protecting and enhancing the
public domain in intellectual property matters. Founded in 1996, UPD is comprised of
computer and software experts, small businesses, students, professors, lawyers,
librarians, and concerned Americans who seek common ground in order to provide a
strong voice for the public’s rights in intellectual property matters.
Amici are deeply concerned with both the effects of the Copyright Term
Extension Act2 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bono Act”) on the public domain as well
as with the disturbing circumstances under which it was created. This Amici Curiae brief
is filed because of concern that the true policy of the Copyright Clause has been
perverted. This distortion almost exclusively surrounds the retroactive portion of the bill.
These amici believe that it is only the failure to distinguish retrospective from
prospective term extensions when considering their respective constitutional bases that
has kept the courts below from reaching the correct result in this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case affords this Court a unique opportunity to do more by doing less.
Judicial restraint generally impels this Court to decide only essential constitutional issues.
Here the issues are uniquely situated so that the decision of only one issue—that of
retrospective extensions—will do far more than merely defer the remaining issue of
prospective extensions, but will render that issue permanently beyond any need of
judicial review.
If this Court decides that retrospective extensions are unconstitutional, it will not
only be able to avoid deciding the other issue today of whether a prospective extension
violates the “limited times” Constitutional provision3 but will likely never have to decide
1 Several law student members of PIPLA helped to prepare this amicus brief: Marquetta Bryan, Jay
Crook, Michael Dolan, Jr., Lisa Johnson, Angela Marshall, Edward R. Pekarek, Dawn Snyder, and Peter
D. Traska.
2 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). The Act
retroactively increased the term of protection for existing copyright from seventy-five to ninety-five years
for works-for-hire, and from life plus fifty to life plus seventy years for all other works, and did the same
prospectively for future works.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

6

that issue. Prospective copyright term extensions are reviewable only with great
difficulty. Fortunately, however, the primary reason Congress has been urged to extend
copyright terms is to obtain retrospective, not prospective, extension. By seizing this
opportunity to declare only retrospective copyright extensions unconstitutional, this
Court can remedy the distortion of the political process effected by its proponents.
Congress will then be free to balance the competing concerns of incentives for authorship
and a rich public domain, unburdened from constitutionally suspect demands that are
inconsistent with the design of the Copyright Clause.

ARGUMENT
I.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT MILITATES AGAINST REVIEWING MORE OF A
STATUTE THAN IS NECESSARY.

This Court has consistently placed a premium on restraint: “If there is one
doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication,
it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication
is unavoidable.”4 Moreover, this Court has underlined the fact that it is often not so
much a question of refusing to decide but rather of deferring. “A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”5 This Court avoids intrusion
into the legislative process as much as possible. As the decision below asserts, “a court
should avoid, not seek out, a constitutional issue the resolution of which is not essential
to the disposition of the case before it.”6 These amici contend that the issue of copyright
extension offers this Court a unique opportunity to choose the least intrusive approach,
while at the same time resolving all of the larger issues involved in this profoundly
important question.
Not only is this approach the most prudential, but it also reflects the same
deferential restraint that this Court routinely applies to other areas. For instance, this
Court declines review of federal questions decided by state courts resting on independent
and adequate state grounds.7 The political question doctrine is another example of this

4 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
5 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). This Court recently
reiterated that logic: “[i]t is true that we have often stressed the importance of avoiding the premature
adjudication of constitutional questions.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 n. 11 (1997).
6 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C.Cir. 2001).
7 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 U.S.
487 (1965).
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restraint.8 Similarly, this Court avoids constitutional bases where statutory construction
serves the same goal because it preserves the delicate balance of power between the
judiciary and legislative branches.9 This Court’s doctrines requiring cases and
controversies, refusing moot questions, granting certiorari with selectivity, and most
critical to the correct disposition of this case, severability, all serve the goals of preserving
judicial resources and minimizing intrusion.
Rather than constraining this Court, the principle of judicial restraint underlying
all the doctrines discussed above can lead this Court to a resolution of this case that
establishes clear copyright doctrine and restores the precise Constitutional balance
demanded by the Copyright Clause. Although copyright terms are not unreviewable, it is
primarily a Congressional task to discern the prospective copyright terms that best
promote progress. A court would be hard pressed to decide ipso facto whether seventyfive or ninety-five years is the optimum term to balance the societal need for access to the
public domain with that of a sufficient incentive for authors to create. Of course, at some
point Congress might be urged to enact a coypright term which for all practical purposes
is unlimited and therefore violates the Copyright Clause. However, there is no need
whatsoever to conduct that review in this case. If Congress is firmly and unequivocally
prohibited from hereafter granting retrospective extensions, these amici submit that it will
not likely have cause to violate the Constitution again.
II.

BUT FOR RETROSPECTIVE EXTENSION THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN
NO CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN TERM EXTENSION

The Bono Act’s legislative history reveals the unarguable truth that, were it not
for retrospective extension, no extension would have been enacted at all.10 That is,
although the resulting extension was for both retrospective and prospective terms, only
retrospective extension motivated those supporting the Bono Act. And this makes
economic, although certainly not constitutional, sense.
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Supreme Court has stated that, “[a]n Art. III court's resolution
of a question that is ‘political’ in character can create far more disruption among the three co-equal branches
of Government than the resolution of a question presented in a moot controversy.” Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 1005-06 (1979). Among the factors provided by this Court to discover whether a case
involves a political question is when there are “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. This certainly evokes the kind of difficulty posed by the
question of appropriate copyright terms, although these amici do not believe this case involves a truly
political question.
9 It is settled doctrine that the Supreme Court “will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress
if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” U.S. v. Clark,
445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980). This maxim of construing acts of Congress to avoid Constitutional questions is
based both on a desire to avoid premature adjudication of constitutional issues, and on the belief that in
areas where legislation might intrude on constitutional guarantees, Congress would err on the side of those
constitutional liberties. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 697 (1984).
10 A detailed summary of how all the proponents of copyright term extension were interested solely in
retrospective extension can be found in, Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution:
“Have I Stayed Too Long?” 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 996-1002 (2000).
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Economic realities explain that there is simply not enough present value in any
prospective extension to justify serious interest in such extensions and, indeed, that is
why those benefiting from retrospective extension were the chief proponents of extension
in the first place. The present value of the additional twenty years of copyright
exclusivity granted by prospective extension adds less than a microscopic one-tenth of
one per cent to the expected cash flow during an initial fifty year term.11 It defies logic to
conclude that any sound business practice would include deploying substantial resources
to secure such a poor investment. Compare this, however, to the immediate returns of
billions of dollars of profit guaranteed by retrospective extension12 and it becomes
obvious how the failure to impose constitutional limits upon retrospective extensions
distorts the democratic process.
These amici do not deny that there are other reasons that copyright term
extension might be demanded—in this case, for instance, advocates of global
harmonization argued that the difference between U.S. terms and some (but, notably,
hardly all) foreign terms meant that U.S. authors enjoyed less exclusivity than others
overseas.13 The Court of Appeals concluded that the Bono Act achieved harmonization
with European Union copyright standards and that such standardization of terms is a
valid exercise of an enumerated Congressional power,14 without questioning whether
there was a less intrusive way of accomplishing this without constitutional damage.
However, the argument that harmonization required retrospective extension is simply
wrong, because prospective extension can accomplish the same result, although over a
longer period of time.
While these amici do not accept that such foreign considerations should dictate
U.S. copyright interests, they nevertheless believe that Congress is most competent to
decide that issue if confined to a constitutionally valid prospective treatment. Congress
must have the opportunity to assess that question in a fair and impartial democratic
manner, untainted by the arguably illegitimate lobbying demands of corporate advocates
11 Dean Hal R. Varian Aff. at 8-9, Appendix to the record filed in the appeal from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia at A 64-67.
12 The Disney investment in the “Winnie the Pooh” characters will apparently yield more than one billion
dollars per year, for which Disney paid about $350 million. Disney Buys the Rights to Winnie the Pooh,
N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2001, at C12.
13 The reasons for this go beyond the interests and arguments of these amici, but an international
copyright law doctrine, the rule of the shorter term, allows countries to apply the foreign country term to
foreign authors, where that term is shorter than the protecting country. Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 7(8), Sept. 9, 1886, and later revisions. The rule of the
shorter term is actually an exception to the general international copyright law doctrine of national
treatment which would otherwise give foreigners all the benefits that nationals receive. Prior to the present
extension, because some countries applied a lifetime plus seventy-year term, American works received only
their lifetime plus fifty-year term under the rule of the shorter term. EU Directive of Oct. 29, 1993,
93/98/EEC, O.J. 1993 No.L 290.
14 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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for unconstitutional retrospective extension. Should Congress be convinced that longer
prospective terms are desirable in furtherance of the progress of expressive works and
without the specter of monied lobbying interests, it can assuredly be trusted to decide the
matter. And notably, if Congress decides to reject such an extension, it could have
important global ramifications such as encouraging foreign countries to re-examine the
merits of grossly extended copyright terms.
It is difficult to exaggerate the mischief caused by those seeking retroactive
extension. One of the most influential supporters of the Bono Act was the Walt Disney
Corp., which had acquired the rights to the “Winnie the Pooh” characters.15 In its
purchase agreement, Disney made its obligations contingent upon the successful passage
of the Bono Act retrospective extension, much like a potential home buyer who includes a
mortgage financing contingency clause. Treating Congress as if it were one’s private
banker vividly demonstrates the growing hazards of allowing copyright terms to escape
their constitutional bounds. This potential mischief was illustrated in its most extreme
form when Sonny Bono’s widow (while serving the remainder of his term), stated upon
presentation of the bill:
Actually, Sonny wanted copyright to last forever. I
I am informed by staff that such a change would
violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work
with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all ways
available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
Valenti’s proposal to last forever less one day.
Perhaps the committee may look at that next
Congress.16

These amici recognize that retroactive extensions are not unusual, but they do not
believe that should deter this Court from finding them constitutionally flawed. It is true
that, as the Court of Appeals noted, every past copyright term extension has extended
subsisting as well as future terms, a progression which these amici believe has now
reached proportions which demand the present review.17 When the 1976 Copyright Act
was enacted, the terms of works under the earlier 1909 Act were all extended from a
maximum of fifty-six to the seventy-five years that the new Act applied to all nonworks-for-hire.18 Retrospective extensions, although on a smaller scale, also occur in
patent law. The extension of existing patent terms by the passage of private legislative
bills has become somewhat controversial.19 And, of course, many of the same arguments
15 Jon M. Garon, Media and Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the
Marketplace of Ideas, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 491, 600 (1999).
16 144 CONG. REC. H9951 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Bono).
17 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 and 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
18 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 303 and 304.
19 See, Robert Patrick Merges and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent
Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000).
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about the Bono Act would certainly apply to those private bills: the drugs have already
been invented, for instance, and an increased term does not serve to promote progress
with respect to an already-invented drug.
However, despite the similarities, previous copyright extensions and the private
bills extending patent terms are markedly different from the Bono Act, at least for
purposes of this appeal. It has been over a quarter century since the 1976 Act was
enacted. Unlike the Bono Act, many have relied on those extensions and, fortunately,
those terms are either on the cusp of expiration or have already expired, rendering the
question essentially moot. By the same token, extensions of patent terms for at least
some pharmaceuticals are often sought because of other very different, and arguably
legitimate circumstances (e.g., FDA approval). Thus, there is no reason to assume,
without more, that invalidating the Bono Act would automatically invalidate private
patent extension bills. Surely, at a minimum, that question can await its own hearing.
If Congress is afforded the chance to consider the question of prospective term
extensions unsullied by illegitimate pressures for retroactive extension, it may actually
decide to shorten rather than extend copyright terms. This is especially true in a world
where functional works such as computer programs have only recently been afforded
copyright protection, and where such works routinely and predictably become antiquated
well prior to the end of their copyright terms.20
III.

THIS CASE INVOLVES ONLY ONE QUESTION THAT DEMANDS
REVIEW: RETROSPECTIVE TERM EXTENSION

Petitioners seek to have both aspects of the Bono Act, retrospective and
prospective extension, declared unconstitutional. These amici believe that certain unique
features of this case would allow this Court to effectively address both issues by directly
addressing only one—retrospective extension.
This case therefore presents a truly unique opportunity to exercise judicial review
and judicial restraint at the same time, in a perfectly balanced symbiotic manner. The
dynamic between prospective and retrospective copyright term extensions presents an
ideal situation where this Court can declare part of a statute unconstitutional while at the
same time it will increase the autonomy and legitimacy of Congress to decide the
remaining issue.

20 Computer software becomes obsolete within ten years and many programs must be upgraded
approximately every three years. See, Charles N. Faerber, Book Versus Byte: The Prospects and
Desirability of a Paperless Society, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 797, 813 (Spring 1999).
Compare the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act where Congress has recognized the volatility and the
shorter usefulness of the semiconductor chip mask works by choosing a ten-year protection period over
copyright’s substantially larger periods. 17 U.S.C. § 904(b). See also, Leo J. Raskind, Symposium: The
Future of Software Protection: The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Computer
Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (Summer 1986), which argues a term more comparable to the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act should be applied to software protection.
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Retrospective extension cannot possibly serve to promote the progress of
expressive original works of authorship by offering the incentive of a term increase to an
author, or his or her assigns, post hoc. 21 Prospective extension, however, is a
considerably more difficult matter because it is not so much the promotion of progress,
but rather the “limited times” portion of the Copyright Clause that is at issue. Both the
District Court and Court of Appeals faced this problem: how long is too long? Both
courts seem to have answered to a greater or lesser degree that they are uncertain, with the
Court of Appeals ostensibly suggesting that the matter was essentially not justiciable and
that the Copyright Clause offers no cognizable legal limits whatsoever.22
These amici believe that it is the very difficulty in determining what is a “limited
time” that has needlessly complicated this case. The courts below deemed, wrongly,
these amici would suggest, that the case dealt with little more than the issue of limited
times.23 Had the issues of prospective and retrospective extension been clearly
distinguished below, amici believe the lower courts could have seen that, although
prospective extensions may pose an apparently impenetrable question, it is one that need
not be answered now and perhaps need never be answered.
In light of the fact that prospective extensions are more effectively controlled—if
at all—by the “limited times” portion of the Copyright Clause, a decision invalidating
copyright extension on that ground could well create an ongoing obligation by this Court
to oversee future Congressional extensions. But the Bono Act is the culmination of a
habit of copyright term extensions in which retrospective and prospective portions were
inextricably and unconstitutionally entangled. By holding that retrospective extension
alone is unconstitutional, and that the two sections of the Bono Act are inseverable, this
Court can safely leave prospective extension to future Congressional consideration.

21 The logic used by the Court of Appeals and Congress to justify the Bono Act is inconsistent with the
decision of this Court in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, this Court noted that just because
Congress concluded that a given piece of legislation serves a constitutional purpose, “does not necessarily
make it so.” Id. at 557, n. 2 [quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 311(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)]. In limiting the power of Congress to legislate
under the Commerce Clause, the Court took note of the source of the power itself. “[L]imitations on the
commerce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 553. The contention
by Congress and the Court of Appeals that the creation of extra income can “promote progress” by leading
to the creation of more works and the preservation of existing works smacks of the same over-extended
rationale as was flatly rejected in Lopez.
22 The appellate court felt bound by its “holding in Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981), in
which [it] rejected the argument ‘that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit
on congressional power.’” Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
23 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378-379.
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IV.

THE RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE PORTIONS OF THE BONO
ACT ARE NOT SEVERABLE

If this Court accepts the conclusion that the retrospective portions of the Bono
Act are indeed unconstitutional, the final question is whether the remaining portions of
the Act can stand alone. Generally, courts do not review and invalidate any more of a
Congressional enactment than necessary. 24 “The standard for determining the
severability of an unconstitutional provision is well established: ‘Unless it is evident that
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independent of that which is not, the invalid part may by dropped if what is left is fully
operative as a law.’”25 This Court’s most recent articulation of the standard for severing
federal statutory provisions retains the necessary condition that to save a portion of an
otherwise unconstitutional statute, this Court must find that Congress would have
otherwise enacted the remainder of the legislation without the unconstitutional portion.
“The unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence
would not have been enacted.”26 This Court’s severability standard defers to the
judgment of Congress as much as possible, and focuses the inquiry on legislative intent.27
Congressional intent may be gleaned from the language and structure of the
legislation and from its history.28 Intent is clear when there is a severability clause; there
is no such clause in the Bono Act. “In the absence of a severability clause… Congress’
silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a presumption against severability.”29 It
is highly unlikely that Congress would have passed any copyright reform at all in 1998
were it not for those who sought relief from the threat of imminently expiring copyrights.
Simply, there would have been no prospective extension of copyright protection but for
those seeking the unconstitutional provisions. Because the legislative history leaves no
doubt that the Bono Act would not have been enacted at all but for its retrospective
extension provisions, the prospective provisions may not be severed from the law. The
prospective portions of the Bono Act fail to meet the condition of this Court’s
severability test30 and accordingly must also be struck.

24 Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion).
25 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987), quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108
(1976), quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
26 Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
27 Id. at 685-86.
28 Id. at 687.
29 Id. at 686.
30 A more complete explanation of why the retrospective and prospective portions of the Bono Act are not
severable can be found in, Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I Stayed
Too Long?” 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 1032–36 (2000).
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The prudential advantage of solely invalidating retrospective copyright is that it
unburdens Congress, within its constitutionally mandated discretion, to extend or shorten
the copyright term in accordance with the democratic process. This Court can be
confident that the political process, instead of continuous judicial review, will supply
effective oversight. Moreover, it is only the allure of retroactive extension and the undue
lobbying influence it invites that has to date perverted the process.

CONCLUSION
With its generally restrained posture, this Court has suggested that where judicial
review is concerned, less is more. While it seems clear that retrospective extension
violates the promotion of progress principle underlying the Constitution's Copyright
Clause, it is more debatable whether the additional twenty years the Bono Act added
prospectively to copyright terms clearly violates the Constitutional limited terms
provision. These amici believe that this Court can constructively avoid deciding that
more vexing issue by finding only the retrospective extension unconstitutional. Because
the two provisions are not severable under the Alaska Airlines test, this Court can allow
Congress to revisit the issue of prospective extension.
This Court can safely leave the more problematic issue of prospective extension
to Congress once it no longer serves as the stalking-horse of what can only be called an
overly grasping copyright strategy. Well-funded but constitutionally flawed interests
have overwhelmed Congress and distorted copyright policy, allowing for the passage of
one retroactive extension after another in defiance of the Constitution. Allowing Congress
in its discretion to adopt sound copyright policy—as it goes about adjusting the
copyright term to optimize progress of expressive works, but not to serve as an ill-gotten
windfall to authors of past works—in circumstances free of those constitutionally
damaging interests, will ensure that this Court is not asked to decide again what
constitutes an appropriate copyright term.
Respectfully submitted,
Professor Michael H. Davis, Esq.
Counsel of Record
Cleveland State University
College of Law
1801 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
(216) 687-2228
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